




Business Anthropology: Towards an Anthropology 
of Worth? 






All the articles published in this issue of the JBA are concerned with 
values of one sort or another and with the ways in which people and 
organizations evaluate and valuate what is going on around them. 
Business and trading relations of all kinds invariably involve the 
negotiation of different values– whether it is the price of a commodity, the 
worth of a brand, or the uses to which ‘corporate culture’ is put. Some 
events, such as trade fairs, awards ceremonies, and competitions of 
various kinds, bring together different actors who ‘configure a field’ 
(Lampel and Meyer 2008) and engage in a ‘tournament of values’ 
(Appadurai 1986; Moeran 2010).  In this respect, business anthropology 
is a corollary of the sociology of valuation and evaluation. According to 
this strand of thought, scholars are ‘concerned with how value is 
produced, diffused, assessed, and institutionalized across a range of 
settings’ (Lamont 2012: 203). Indeed, these are basic social processes, 
together with boundary work, standardization, commensuration, 
differentiation, closure, and exploitation (ibid.). They cut to the core of 
how it is that we negotiate and come to agree, or disagree, on the value of 
something. For anthropologists, what is attractive about the sociology of 
valuation and evaluation is that it focuses on (e)valuation as it occurs in 
social practices, and not inside the mind of an individual.  
The opinions on the anthropology of finance written by Daromir 
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Rudnyckyj, Aihwa Ong, Hirokazu Miyazaki, Benjamin Lee and Melissa 
Fisher take up a number of issues pertaining to valuation and evaluation: 
the influence of a hypothetical model on traders’ behaviour, allowing a 
space purportedly dedicated to the exercise of market principles to end 
up as ‘an elaborate array of social codes, obligations and reciprocity’ 
(Rudnyckyj); the role of Asian financial flows in animating new ecologies 
which generate values ‘beyond sheer economic gains’ (Ong); the end of 
financial expertise implicit in such concepts as arbitrage leading to ‘a 
general sense of the failure of risk-based models of financial calculation’ 
and of the broad willingness – witness the present Japanese 
Government’s promulgation of Abenomics – to ‘embrace radical 
uncertainty’ (Miyazaki); how the notion of contract acts as a model for 
both society and economic relations, so that it is used both ‘to acquire 
wealth, power, security, and autonomy’, on the one hand and, on the 
other, to legitimate tenets ‘that attach these relations to the common 
good’ (Lee); and the gendered practices and values of market actors, by 
juxtaposing global financial markets with ‘intimate and global financial 
spheres’ that enable us to understand ‘how the “private”, feminized 
domains of family, debt, and caring fit within the apparatus and 
technologies of finance’ (Fisher). 
In the four articles accompanying these opinion pieces, Emil 
Røyrvik examines the creation and management of a comprehensive 
‘value-based’ corporate culture and identity-building programme by the 
Norwegian multinational, Hydro, and investigates the valuation processes 
involved in forming a corporate identity, the value/s it creates, represents 
and signifies. He suggests that Hydro’s corporate rhetoric of representing 
itself as an objectified cultural whole, as one entity of social relations with 
identity, is accomplished through a process of objectification and the 
‘ordering of mere differences’, in the sense of both creating and making 
visible social relations. Galit Ailon argues that financialization has brought 
about a change in worldviews and sensibilities in the business world, 
which increasingly subordinates profit to shareholder value, while it is 
the interpretation of the impact of the bottom line on stock prices that 
determines whether a firm will or will not survive. In her view, 
financialization ‘liquidates’ many of the solidities of the recent past, such 
as numerical convictions, schematic thinking habits, and accounting 
assurances. Financialization  accentuates a need ‘to place the question of 
value itself at the center of attention (Batteau and Psenka 2012): to trace 
the processes of its construction, the negotiations over its meaning, the 
types of market images it is tied to, and the ways it is linked to visions and 
concepts of practicality.’ And, she continues, ethnographers are well 
placed to track down value beyond statements of profit, and to discover 
those values that are not officially ‘counted’. 
Pauline Garvey looks at values from the perspective of consumption 
and material culture: in particular, at the relational values afforded by 
having, wearing and showing furniture and clothing. Physical forms 
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embody ‘the vagaries of differential interpretation’ and so allow Ikea 
furniture to become a type of (H&M) clothing. Garvey highlights the 
relational value that having, wearing and showing allow, in the 
metaphorical sense, and points to the dual role of Ikea interiors as a 
representation of the world, while also offering a space for people to be 
located in. Interpretation and evaluation in the final article in this issue, 
by Michiel Verver and Heidi Dahles, centre on delineation of a political 
and geographical region (Southeast Asia), on the one hand, and 
competing perspectives on the nature of Chinese capitalism, on the other. 
Verver and Dahles claim that the concept of culture, and long-established 
ideas of the internalization of cultural norms, values, symbols and roles as 
constitutive of a person’s and a group of people’s orientation towards 
action, have largely hindered our understanding of the nature of exchange 
and business. They argue that such culturalist views, detaching cultural 
values from a relational and hierarchical setting, and from the larger 
socio-political context in which they are found, still bear on the academic 
debate about Chinese capitalism. They suggest, instead, a comparative 
approach as a means to grasp the ways in which both long-standing and 
newly created ‘institutional legacies’ are strategically employed, 
abandoned, or silenced, under rapidly changing and ambivalent 
institutional regimes of capitalism. 
To say that business anthropology is a corollary of the sociology of 
valuation and evaluation should not be interpreted as relegating a sub-
field of anthropology to a sub-field of sociology (or, indeed, vice versa). On 
the contrary, we would argue that anthropology itself is, and from its 
inception has been, in very large part the study of evaluation, valuation 
and values. The very fact that the discipline has always focused on cross-
cultural comparison makes this abundantly clear. Anthropologists’ 
interest in the kula ring, segmentary lineage systems, potlatch, pastoral 
nomads, irrigation systems and so on, as well as in cultural concepts like 
honour, shame, patronage, obligation, reciprocity and so forth dominant 
in different societies, attests to their underlying concern with evaluating 
what they observe elsewhere and comparing it with what they have 
experienced in their own lives back home.  
All forms of socio-economic behaviour – as well as all statements, 
expressions, judgements and justifications in language use – are, 
therefore, motivated and underpinned by values and accompanying 
evaluative dispositions of one kind or another. The study of culture – 
whether of its social organization, economic structure, religious beliefs, 
artistic forms, legal system, trading relations, or other phenomena – is a 
study of the values that constitute a particular configuration of culture 
and the evaluations that are practiced by, and negotiated among, people. 
In their plural form, values constitute our socio-cultural beliefs and moral 
principles – the criteria by which we judge or evaluate what is 
worthwhile in our everyday lives (Graeber 2001: 3). Anthropology, then, 
is in large part the study of values and their corresponding ‘tracing of 
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associations’ (Latour 2006: 6). The processual approach of anthropology 
– its interest in tracing associations, tracking flows, and detecting linkages 
– also opens up ways of avoiding tendencies to essentialize culture and 
values. The articles in this volume all testify to this possibility. A focus on 
the relational, social dimensions of business and exchange – of the making 
of value in social processes – rather than on detecting stable entities of 
value, allows for an understanding of how it is that we value, evaluate, 
and ascertain worth.  
In this anthropology differs from, but also in part embraces, the 
discipline of economics, with which it has engaged in inconclusive 
arguments over many decades.1 Most mainstream neo-classical 
economists regard the notion of value (they use the singular, not plural, 
form of the word) as the origin of, and motivation for, all forms of 
economic behaviour. They have built their theories of value around the 
concept of a price system and ‘the technical means for analysing how 
prices are arrived at’ (Slater and Tonkiss 2001: 49; see also Debreu 
1959). So far as they are concerned, value relates to economic utility, 
price and the worth that individuals and social groups assign to 
commodities in the market (Throsby 2001: 19-20). In its singular form, 
then, value has been examined principally as a means towards equating 
the ‘inherent’ qualities of commodities with their quantitative worth. The 
ways in which economists talk about commodities, we suggest, entails a 
reduction of what are essentially social relations to economistic utility 
and price. Human behaviour is ultimately, then, explained in terms of 
desire, pleasure, or some other form of immediate gratification. The social 
fabric of relations, the texture of social relations, tends to disappear, or to 
be ‘explained away’. The kind of rationality underpinning the search to 
satisfy these unlimited desires is a calculative one. Since human being are 
rational, it is assumed, they will attempt to calculate the most efficient 
way to get what they want, thereby contributing to the ‘free market’ 
(Graeber 2001). This form of rationality also tends to do away with any 
attempts to understand what actually motivates human beings to act in 
the ways that they do, beyond that of ‘economizing’.  
The dichotomy between value and values – between economists, on 
the one hand, and sociologists and anthropologists, on the other – has 
been attributed to ‘the Parsons’ Pact’. Many decades ago, when mapping 
out his ambitious sociological programme, Talcott Parsons more or less 
came to a tacit agreement with colleagues in the Harvard University 
Economics Department that economists would study value (thereby 
claiming the economy for themselves), while he and other sociologists 
focused on values (thereby claiming the social relations in which 
economies are embedded) (Stark 2000). As David Stark goes on to argue 
                                                        
1 For discussions of the formalist and substantivist approaches in economic 
anthropology, see, for example, Wilk (1996) and Çalișkan and Callon (2009: 372-
8). 
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(ibid., pp. 2-3), this treaty was broken, first by Harrison White when he 
developed a sociological theory of markets (White 1987, 2001), and later 
by Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot (1991; 2006) who, in arguing that 
economies consist of multiple principles of evaluation and multiple 
orders of worth, have been engaged in constructing a sociological theory 
of value. With Boltanski and Thévenot, a decisive step towards a more 
action-centred economy was taken, as attention was focussed on how 
people qualify, identify, explain, and interpret events, taking their 
justifications seriously and studying them in their plurality – 
accumulating accounts, as it were. There is a pluralist and pragmatist 
epistemology (Dodier 1993), giving accent to multiple worlds of worth 
and how social actors draw on these according to context. 
In the meantime, proponents of one branch of economics, cultural 
economics, have also transgressed the value/values pact by arguing that a 
distinction should be made between ‘economic and cultural value, and 
that it is the nature of these twin concepts of value, how they are formed 
and how they relate or do not relate to each other, that needs to be 
investigated’ (Hutter and Throsby 2008: 1). In this cultural economists 
have impinged upon the territory of economic sociologists and 
anthropologists who, for many decades now, have also seen culture and 
economy as inseparable – the one ‘embedded’ in the other (e.g. 
Granovetter 1985). 
Ironically, while cultural economists have written about, and 
recognize the part played by, all kinds of values – including the aesthetic, 
spiritual, social, historical, symbolic and authenticity values found in art 
works (Throsby 2001: 28-9), as well as ‘non-user values’ of option, 
existence, bequest, prestige and innovative values (Frey 2003) – they still 
cling to a theory of value (in the singular) (Throsby 2001: 19, 24, 28). This 
is also true of the anthropologist, David Graeber, who, in spite of his wide-
ranging discussion and analysis of values held by different peoples in 
different parts of the world, still titles his book Towards an 
anthropological theory of value (Graeber 2001).2 
There is, then, a ‘double discourse’ of value/values: one concerned 
with money, commerce, technology, industry, production and 
consumption, together with the people engaged therein; the other with 
culture, art, genius, creation and appreciation, and their proponents. 
In the first discourse, events are explained in terms of calculation, 
preferences, costs, benefits, profits, prices, and utility. In the second, 
events are explained – or, rather (and this distinction/opposition is 
as crucial as any of the others), ‘justified’ – in terms of inspiration, 
discrimination, taste (good taste, bad taste, no taste), the test of 
time, intrinsic value, and transcendent value. 
(Herrnstein Smith 1988: 127) 
                                                        
2 Appadurai (1986: 21ff.), too, refers to a ‘tournament of value’ in the singular. 
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Not surprisingly, perhaps, there is little coherence among the different 
disciplinary approaches in their conceptualization and measurement of 
these different kinds of values (Hitlin and Piliavin 2004: 359-60). This in 
itself suggests that Stark (2000: 5) is justified in calling for an economic 
sociology (and, by implication, an economic anthropology) that dispenses 
with ‘the dualisms of value versus values and economy versus embedded 
social relations’, and takes as its object of study ‘the sociology of worth’: 
that is, ‘the ongoing processes of valuation’.3 
And yet, Stark (ibid.) also sees processes of evaluation as being 
‘central to the problem of worth’. This raises a Janus-faced issue, which 
has not been entirely resolved in the literature. To talk of ‘worth’ invites a 
clarification of the terms used in the sociology of valuation and 
evaluation, since many of them – including valuation, evaluation, value 
and worth – have often been used in a rather imprecise manner 
(including, on occasion, by one or two contributors to this issue of the 
JBA). This isn’t all that surprising. Dictionary definitions of each of these 
words, as Lamont (2012: 204) notes, tend to overlap. Thus, both valuation 
and evaluation can refer to appraising pecuniary value, which is itself 
equated with worth as the equivalent of a specified sum or amount.4 
However, since all of these words have secondary meanings that 
enable the confusion to be overcome, our suggestion is that henceforth 
they be used in the following ways: valuate to refer to the act of 
estimating or fixing the monetary value (or Value) of something (and 
valuation to the result of such estimation); evaluate to the act of 
estimating other properties of a cultural product that are not directly 
related to money or price (and evaluation to the result thereof); Value 
(with a capital V) to its monetary worth; and worth to the relative merits 
of such a product in respect of the overall estimation (that is, in terms of 
both evaluation and valuation) in which it is held (Beckert and Aspers 
2011: 6). The plural use of values thus comes to refer to the non-monetary 
constituents of worth arrived at through acts of evaluation.  
The problem with assigning the term ‘valuate’ to the estimation of 
monetary value and ‘evaluate’ to other properties not related to money or 
price is that the very dualism between Value and values that Stark wishes 
to overcome is reintroduced. This, in our opinion, is unavoidable. In order 
to arrive at any estimation of worth, we need to take into account the 
patterns of values held by different professional groups occupying 
different structural positions in different organizations; the ways in which 
such values are negotiated among them; and how,  as a result, they 
motivate social behaviour. But we also need to find out how qualitative 
values are converted into quantitative Value, on the one hand, and how, 
                                                        
3 For Stark, it is this that will save economic sociology from being no more than 
the study of business. 
4 Witness, ‘the value, or worth, of a man is as of all other things, his price’ 
(Hobbes 1651: 31). 
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on the other, Value itself has an effect on the evaluation of quality. So, just 
as a Picasso painting or unblemished diamond ring signifies a high price 
tag, so does a high price tag for a painting or piece of jewellery suggest 
that the artist who painted it must be well known (even though s/he may 
not be Picasso), or that the stones set in the ring are not made from glass. 
It is this balancing of values with Value that gives rise to an estimation of 
worth. 
In that such processes of valuation and evaluation are always 
contingent on who is (e)valuating what for whom, when, where, how, 
why, to what ends, and in what context, we may go further and suggest 
that, together, they form inter-related ‘assemblages’, or ensemblages, of 
worth (Moeran forthcoming). Such assemblages encompass, in varying 
emphases, materials and accompanying techniques; aesthetics and 
related moral ideologies; organizational and social values underpinning, 
and underpinned by, names and brands; and the uses to which the objects 
of valuation and evaluation are put. It is ensemblages of worth that 
business anthropology can usefully analyse. This is what we mean when 
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